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Abstract. Just-in-time deliveries are crucial for many industries. They are par-
ticularly essential when the properties of the delivered resource or the demand-
ing processes are sensitive in time. Rigid, centralized planning tends to fail, es-
pecially in dynamic environments with distributed decisions and control. Under 
the constraints of distributed decisions and control, auctions promise an effi-
cient allocation of resources. However, a dedicated design of auctions for just-
in-time deliveries, which can be incorporated into the design of an IT artifact, is 
still lacking. We contribute a linear and a quadratic multi-attribute scoring rule 
for an automated execution by software. We evaluate the artifact in a simulation 
experiment and reveal the effects of the scoring rules for just-in-time deliveries. 
Our results provide evidence that the artifact effectively coordinates just-in-time 
deliveries, which also holds when considering one additional side constraint. 
Keywords: Just-in-Time Delivery, Multi-attribute Auction, Scoring Rule, Dis-
tributed Decisions and Control 
1 Introduction 
Just-in-time (JiT) deliveries are demanded by many industries [9, 13]. In general, JiT 
deliveries are encouraged by the reduction of stocks so as to save storage costs and 
place, to release tied capital, and to diminish the risk of sunken costs [10, 16, 22]. The 
risk of sunken costs exists in particular for resources with perishable properties. The 
road pavement process illustrates the JiT requirements: As soon as the paver’s asphalt 
reservoir runs low it has to be provided with asphalt in the right temperature for fur-
ther processing. The paver must not wait, because discontinuances during the pro-
cessing lead to irregularities in the pavement. As a result of poor paving, the stability 
of the road is affected negatively, which then causes high costs for maintenance and 
repair and impairs the driving safety [5]. 
When just-in-time deliveries are critical in environments where prospects are hard-
ly possible, it is advisable to establish short-cyclic demands, so that an adjustment to 
unforeseen circumstances is possible. The use of IT enhances the adaptability to envi-
ronmental dynamics and the availability of IT permeates throughout all industries. 
Yet, many production processes are constituted as a supply chain with distributed 
decisions and control. An integrated conceptualization would fail, because there is no 
  
effective way to impose directives hierarchically. This situation is prevalent in the 
nature of many supply chains. 
The construction industry sets a good example. During the production process, 
numerous providers are involved, and each of them complies with her own objectives. 
Supply chain management and the maintenance of just-in-time deliveries is a tremen-
dous issue [17, 18]. Anyhow, the construction machines are increasingly equipped 
with digital sensor technology, as well as with digital information processing technol-
ogy. Coordination relevant data is or becomes available and usable. The problem is, 
indeed, the distribution of decisions and control.  
To address this situation we draw from the Mechanism Design Theory (MDT) and 
provide an auction as coordination artifact. Auctions are determined by an explicit set 
of rules [14], and hence their concepts are suitable for adoption by IT engineers. The 
primary outcome of an auction is classically an allocation. However, we utilize auc-
tions also as a mechanism to find the best agreement for certain characteristics of a 
delivery order among multiple providers. The characteristics are reflected by the gen-
eral objectives of JiT deliveries, and encompass the dimensions (1) prize, (2) quantity, 
(3) condition (quality), (4) delivery time, and (5) place of delivery. We incorporate 
the dimensions as attributes for an auction, and design a linear and a quadratic multi-
attribute scoring rule to determine the provider who is awarded a delivery order. The 
linear scoring rule scores proportionally to what extent the JiT objectives are accom-
plished. The quadratic scoring rule allows for a more sophisticated scoring, since the 
marginal scoring is not constant. By providing and evaluating our multi-attribute auc-
tion, we contribute a method for the coordination of JiT deliveries. 
The auction as coordination method allows for an efficient allocation of delivery 
orders to the best-suited deliverer. The deliverer might also be detected from one or 
several contractual partners’ fleet of transport vehicles. An advantage of this proce-
dure, in comparison to a fixed schedule, is that the order retrievals can be adjusted 
individually to the currently present circumstances. On a road construction site, for 
example, when there is an interruption in the paving process, one can observe the 
situation where the asphalt delivering trucks back up at the paver. As a consequence 
the unnecessarily waiting trucks are later on lacking for the provision of supplies.  
We pose the following research question: What is the effect of using multi-attribute 
auctions for just-in-time deliveries? From an IS perspective, we investigate the effect 
of our IT artifact on the organization of a supply chain. To answer this question, we 
report the results of a simulation of the artifact. We reveal the implications of the 
respectively implemented scoring rules for the coordination of just-in-time deliveries, 
and compare both scoring rules.  
Relevance of our research is indicated by the example from above, but also given 
due to the research gap in this field of IS research. Multi-attribute auctions have al-
ready been realized for computer-aided task- and service-allocation [8, 11, 12, 20]. 
Still, a design of auctions for JiT deliveries is lacking. 
The paper is structured in the following way: Sec. 2 provides an overview of the 
state of the art. In sec. 3 our scoring rules are developed as a coordination artifact. 
Sec. 4 reports the evaluation of our artifact. We close our paper with a conclusion and 
an outlook in sec. 5. 
  
2 State of the Art 
The paper at hand relates to other approaches which aim at inducing JiT performances 
through auctions. Witzel & Endriss [21] augment multi-unit auctions with up to four 
time constraints. The formulation of narrow time restrictions enables auctions for just-
in-time deliveries. However, the approach is driven by a logic calculus and thus the 
assessment of the time constraints is either ‘true’ or ‘false’. Soft winner determination 
for the case that no bidder fits the time restrictions is not possible, and so is the de-
termination of ordering relations not possible either. 
Another approach is presented by Nunes et al. [15]. They consider task allocation 
with time-sensitive single-item sequential auctions for spatially distributed robots. 
Therefore, each task is assigned an earliest start time, a latest finish time, and an esti-
mated processing time. An appropriate small choice of the time windows addresses 
JiT requirements. However, integrative multi-attribute auctions are not addressed. 
An early model for multi-attribute auctions has been inquired by Che [7]. Che has 
involved two attributes, one for the prize p, and one for the quality q. The utility for a 
bidding agent b  AB in dependence of these two attributes is determined by 
     pqVqpbu ,, , where V(q) is the valuation of the given quality value. In par-
ticular, V must be differentiated with respect to just-in-time deliveries.  
 Our paper is also related to work about allocation of computational jobs in service 
networks, as multi-attribute auctions are used. Dinther et al. [8] incorporate automated 
negotiations with a scoring rule for services. The scoring rule is of the form 
ii i
S )( , where  is a configuration of a complex service. The service is 
composed in a service network and the index i indicates a node which provides a ser-
vice. Dinther et al. provide results for the formation of service networks. However, 
the problem at hand, pertaining to just-in-time deliveries, is to find one sole agent 
who is best suited for the fulfillment of a demand. 
Multi-attribute auctions have also been used to improve sustainability in cloud 
computing. Widmer et al. [20] factor in the expected energy consumption for the allo-
cation of services in cloud computing. In their simulative evaluation, Widmer et al. 
assigned different weights to the prize of a service and its energy consumption. They 
finally assessed the utility ratio of the outcome. However, the scoring model directly 
incorporates energy specific key figures, and thus a transfer onto the inducement of 
just-in-time deliveries is not given.  
In an experimental setting, Haak & Gimpel [11] have investigated bidding rules for 
the automation of negotiations for service level agreements (SLA). They compared 
three rules for multi-attribute auctions, among others with respect to individual ra-
tionality and incentive compatibility. The rules are: (1) Tuple-bidding, where the cus-
tomer proposes a tuple of price and quality and the seller accepts or declines. (2) 
Scoring-bidding, where the customer gives a scoring function and the seller sets a 
quality and a prize accordingly or declines. (3) Discount-bidding, which is the same 
as (2) but allows for discounts. The auction rules only compare prize with quality 
directly. It is not specified how different quality attributes interact with each other and 
how the interplay influences the overall outcome.  
  
Another approach for the automation of the negotiation for SLA by multi-attribute 
auctions is given by Kieninger et al. [12]. They consider a multi-attribute offer as a 
tuple of service incident patterns, such as outages or disfunctions. The winner of the 
auction is determined by the expected business costs, which are computed by multi-
plying the frequencies of the service incident patterns with the business costs for a 
service. However, the last two presented papers do not fit to the problem of inducing 
just-in-time deliveries. 
Our paper is also related to work of Bichler et al. [4], who give a comprehensive 
overview of the usage of auctions for procurement with IT. In an earlier work, Bichler 
[1] has investigated the more general question, whether multi-attribute auctions 
achieve better outcomes than traditional auctions for the prize of an item only. Later, 
Bichler & Kalagnanam [2] have applied the concept of multi-attribute auctions to 
configurable offers and to auctions with multiple sources. Although progress has been 
made, regarding multi-attribute auctions with IT, the design of scoring rules for the 
automated procurement of just-in-time deliveries has not been inquired, yet.  
Quadratic scoring rules were not implemented in any of the preceding works. 
3 Artifact Design 
3.1 Formal Framework 
We take an auction as a mechanism for resource allocation between one auctioneer 
and multiple bidders, which is constituted by a bidding process over potentially sever-
al attributes of one or more items [3]. The items are the resources that shall be allocat-
ed, and the attributes determine the characteristics of what an agreement must be 
found − besides the pure allocation of the item. The notion of a resource, i.e. of the 
items, is to be understood in a broad sense that covers tangible goods, as well as in-
tangible goods, or services, so objects, as well as performances, or even commitments 
to eventually execute a task. The objective of the auction is to optimize the agreement 
for the attributes from the auctioneer’s viewpoint, respectively to find the bidder with 
whom the best agreement can be found.  
We employ the following basic model: I is the set of items, and B  (I) is the set 
of item bundles from the power set over I. C is the set of attributes (characteristics), 
where Yc  IR is the value range of c  C. Each bundle is attributed with an array of 
characteristics to which we refer with   B  CM . Because the relation  is function-
al, we obtain the attributes of a bundle b  B by (b). For the sake of notation, please 
be aware that for each bundle, M may be a different dimension reflecting the number 
of attributes. Each attribute is assigned a respective value by  :   YM, where 
 Cc cYY  . 
A is the set of agents, the set of bidders is AB  A, and the set of auctioneers is 
AA  A. Each agent a  A gets the utility u(a, ). Note, that  is in fact a triple 
B  CM  YM, which means that not only the attributes and its values are essential, 
regarding the utility for an agent, but the bundle itself, too. Let us exemplify the for-
mality (later we will simplify the notation). 
  
Example 1: The item set  
 I = {Asphalt, Concrete} 
consists of a transport order for asphalt and for concrete. There are only two bundles, 
comprised of one item each, i.e.  
 B = {{Asphalt}, {Concrete}}. 
Both bundles have the same attributes,  
 ({Asphalt}) = ({Concrete}) = (Time, Prize), 
being the delivery time and the charged prize. The attribute values shall be equal, e.g. 
 (({Asphalt})) = (({Concrete})) = (30.0, 70.0), 
where the units of the first and the second component are “minutes” and “Euro per 
ton”, respectively. It is obvious that for an asphalt paving agent the utility for the as-
phalt delivery should be higher than the utility for the concrete delivery, although the 
attributes and its values are exactly the same. 
Example 2: Now let us consider the item set consisting of orders for diverse asphalt 
types that are needed for a road’s base layer, binder layer and wearing layer respec-
tively,  
 I = {Base, Binder, Wearing}. 
They can be purchased individually or together, so the bundle set  
 B = {{Base}, {Binder}, {Wearing}, {Base, Binder, Wearing}}. 
The single item bundles have all the same attributes,  
 ({Base}) = ({Binder}) = ({Wearing}) = (Time, Prize). 
The combined bundle has the attributes  
 ({Base, Binder, Wearing}) = (Time1, Time2, Time3, Prize), 
where the semantic of the Timei-values is the delivery time of one particular kind of 
asphalt. In a similar way subsequently delivered batch orders could be represented, 
e.g. with the item set 
 I = {Base1, Base2, Base3}. 
Based on the notion above and on prior literature [6], we qualify the core proper-
ties of auctions by three criterions: (1) Number of items, (2) attribute set, and (3) 
character. 
 (1) The number of items to be auctioned has a significant impact on the complexi-
ty of the winner determination problem. We only distinguish if single items are auc-
  
tioned separately, or whether bids over bundles of items are possible. In the former 
case B  I, by which we mean that  contains exactly the same amount of elements as 
I and each element of B contains exactly one element of I. The latter case is referred 
to as combinatorial auction, where the number of possible bundles, and hence the 
search space for an optimal bid, may be exponential in the number of items. (2) The 
attribute set states whether the auction consists of a single attribute or of multiple 
attributes, i.e. whether M = 1. The former case corresponds to the idea of perfect 
competition for a prize only. The interesting aspect in the latter case is to enable effi-
cient outcomes with respect to the auctioneer’s and bidders’ prioritization of the at-
tributes, which potentially allows for tradeoffs. (3) Therefore, we address also the 
character of an auction, which can either be integrative or distributive. In distributive 
auctions either the auctioneer wins and the bidders lose per bid or vice versa [19]. 
Integrative auctions offer the opportunity to find compromises between the auctioneer 
and a bidder, which are not bound to the fixed pie assumption of distributive auctions, 
i.e. win-win outcomes are possible. More formally, let ” and ’ be two distinct value 
characteristics of a bid for a bundle b and a1, a2  A be two distinct agents. An auc-
tion is integrative if u(a1, ”) > u(a1,’)  u(a2, ”) > u(a2,’) is possible. 
Based on that conceptualization our contribution is a single-item, multi-attribute, 
integrative auction. 
3.2 The Auction Model 
The essential part for the design of the auction is the triple . This variable aggregates 
an item bundle with its attributes and the respective attribute values. Since the auction 
shall coordinate just-in-time deliveries, the item set contains an order for the delivery 
of a resource, I = {Delivery order}. The bundle set contains only the one item, 
B = {{Delivery order}}. The Delivery order here is rather a placeholder for an order 
to deliver a particular resource, e.g. asphalt. Because there is solely one element in the 
bundle set, we omit the explicit statement of the arguments for  and . It is unam-
biguous to what we refer respectively. Although we regard technically a single-item 
auction we always refer to “the bundle” to retain stringency. The restriction to a single 
item reduces complexity, but in principle our model allows for combinatorial auc-
tions, too. 
The attribute set C = {Prize, Quantity, Condition, Time, Place}. The attributes of 
the bundle  = (Prize, Quantity, Condition, Time, Place). We use in the following the 
respective first two letters as abbreviation, i.e. Pr, Qu, Co, Ti, Pl. The value range of 
each attribute c  C is given by Yc. We require that each Yc  IR, so each attribute 
must be mapped to a real number. The satisfaction of this requirement is not straight-
forward regarding the attributes Condition and Place. A place is usually given by a 
Cartesian product of two or three real numbers specifying coordinates. However, 
there is always a natural possibility to express the distance to a reference point with 
one sole real number. One can consider the shortest path in a road network to the 
reference point, or the time that is needed to get there, or even the consumption of 
fuel. No matter which projection is used, information will be lost. Still, for our pur-
pose the one-dimensional distance to a reference point is sufficient. The reference 
  
point is the aspired place of delivery. Bidders can bid for the distance to that reference 
point as delivery place. In cases where the place is not subject for negotiation the only 
accepted distance is zero.  
The attribute describing the condition poses more difficulties. First of all it is not 
always straightforward to assess the condition of a resource quantitatively. That is 
why we introduce formally an auxiliary function that we call yCo and that returns a 
real number as value for the Condition attribute. In the best case, yCo is a sensor which 
returns a measurement directly, e.g. a temperature or a viscosity. The function may 
however also be a mapping from qualitative attributes onto a real number. The latter 
case is not straightforward, though. 
The auction is carried out by an agent a  AA who demands a resource at a specific 
time. To find the bidder who is best suited for the fulfillment of the demand, the auc-
tioneer agent a scores the bids with a scoring function S :   IR. Based on the scor-
ing function S the order is awarded to the bidder b
*
  AB who attains the highest 
score. Please note that the scoring of a bid is not necessarily identical to the utility 
from that bid. We take the scoring function as a technical means to map priorities on 
the auction attributes. Since the co-domain of the scoring function S is IR, the array of 
attribute values  must be mapped onto one sole number. A reduction of multiple 
values to one value is non-trivial because information is lost inevitably. Our general 
approach is to score each attribute value c individually, and to connect the individual 
scores Sc(c) with a commutative, associative operator “◦”. 
 S() = SPr(Pr) ◦ SQu(Qu) ◦ SCo(Co) ◦ STi(Ti) ◦ SPl(Pl). 
Commutativity and associativity make sure that the order, in which the individual 
scoring functions are computed, is irrelevant. We use the simple additive operation: 
 S() = SPr(Pr) + SQu(Qu) + SCo(Co) + STi(Ti) + SPl(Pl) = 
Cc
ccS )( . 
With the additive operation the score of each attribute is considered independently. 
Hence, one particularly favorable attribute value can potentially compensate for an 
attribute with a low score. When used, for instance, the multiplication, then the entire 
scoring S() converged to zero as soon as the score of one single attribute value be-
comes close to zero. Consecutively, the scoring functions need to be designed. 
3.3 The Scoring Rules 
Basically, the linear scoring rule scores the deviation of an attribute value from the 
aspired value optc  for the corresponding attribute c. The minimum and maximum 
attribute values are defined by minc  and 
max
c . It is 
min
c   
opt
c   
max
c and the value 
range Yc = [
min
c ,
max
c ]. Note, that the value range of the attributes is the domain of 
the scoring function. The weighting factor c constitutes at the same time the maxi-
mum score for the attribute c. The linear scoring rule for the individual attributes c 
reads: 
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For the score at the interval boundaries it always holds 0 maxc
min
c  . The maxi-
mum score is only realized for the aspired attribute value c
opt
ccS  )( . The explicit 
definition of the case for optcc    allows to set 
opt
c
min
c   , or 
max
c
opt
c   , or 
max
c
opt
c
min
c   . Fig. 1 depicts the function graph of two instances of the linear 
scoring rule for the attribute c = Time. Both graphs are underlay with 20minTi , 
40optTi , and 50
max
Ti , but the black graph is underlay with the weighting factor 
Ti = 1 and the gray graph is underlay with the weighting factor Ti = 3. A deviation 
from the aspired attribute value is penalized linearly. If Sc(c) =  then the value of 
the attribute c is out of the settlement range. The settlement range is described by 
Walton & McKersie [19] and we adopted the concept in the following way: An 
agreement for the bundle can only be settled if  c  C : c  Yc. That means, if bid-
ders make an offer where at least one attribute value is beyond the auctioneer’s ac-
ceptable value range, then there is no agreement for the bundle at all. 
The linear scoring rule cannot express that the marginal scores may be dependent 
of the current score of the respective attribute value. A deviation around the optimal 
attribute value shall potentially have a smaller effect than the same deviation at the 
interval boundaries. A nearby enhancement of linear models is the extension to a 
second-degree polynomial. Therefore, we posit the following (mathematical) condi-
tions: 
Fig. 1. Linear scoring function with different weighting factors (for the Time attribute) 
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In expression (1) either minc  or 
max
c  is applied, according to whether the left-hand 
or the right-hand interval is determined. The expression ensures that the score at the 
interval boundaries is zero. Expression (2) ensures that the aspired attribute value gets 
the maximum score. In difference to the linear model, there is a third degree of free-
dom. With expression (3) we define that the marginal score is zero for the aspired 
attribute value. This claim has two reasons. On the one hand, the formal justification 
is that there is no other optimum than the score at the aspired attribute value. That 
holds even without restricting the domain. On the other hand, the claim implies the 
following property: The nearer an attribute value converges to the aspired value, the 
less is the increment of the score. And for the aspired attribute value the marginal 
increment is zero ultimately. On the other side, the more an attribute value diverges 
from the optimum value, the higher is the penalization. The implication is that it is 
harder to compensate bad attribute values (around maxminc
/ ) than to get additional 
scores from good attribute values (around optc ). In terms of utilities the property is 
known as risk avoidance. Solving the parameters a, b, c yields the quadratic scoring 
rule: 
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Fig. 2 depicts the quadratic scoring rule (black graph) in comparison with the linear 
scoring rule (gray graph), again for the Time attribute, but here with Ti = 2. 
The score of the quadratic rule is steadily above the linear scoring, when consider-
ing the same weighting factors and interval boundaries. The important property, how-
ever, is that the quadratic scoring rule converges smoothly towards the optimum and 
diverges disproportionally in the other direction. 
  
Fig. 2. Quadratic and linear scoring function in comparison (for the Time attribute) 
4 Artifact Evaluation 
4.1 Simulation Plan 
The evaluation is aligned towards the research question: What is the effect of using 
the multi-attribute scoring rules for auctions for just-in-time deliveries? We subdivid-
ed the research question into three operational questions Q1 – Q3. 
Q1: How does the variation of the weighting factor c affect the outcome for the at-
tribute value c? In particular, we focus on c = Time, but also on c = Condition.  
Q2: How does the variation of the weighting factor c affect the outcome for the 
other attribute values −c? 
Q3: What is the difference between the linear scoring rule and the quadratic scor-
ing rule with respect to Q1 and Q2.  
So, the independent variables are the weighting factors for the Time attribute, and 
in an additional evaluation for the Condition attribute, too. The dependent variables 
are the (relative) deviations from the aspired values for each attribute. To answer the 
research questions Q1 – Q3 we conducted a simulation of the artifact with artificial 
data. So as to diminish the probability of pure coincidental results we used the aver-
ages of 1000 runs. With the confidence level of 99% the averages are less than 0.5 
around the true mean for the Time attribute. The attribute values were drawn random-
ly from the settlement range Yc for each of the n agents in each run. For the possible 
attribute values we used a uniform distribution with an integer step width of 1.  
The parameterization of the simulation is based on a road pavement scenario. The 
condition of delivered asphalt is described by its temperature and plays a crucial role. 
For the sake of comparability, we normalized the resulting deviations with the highest 
possible deviation for the corresponding attribute value. We assume that the place is 
not subject for negotiation, and hence we state YPl = {0}, 0
max
Pl
opt
Pl
min
Pl  . That 
is, any deviation from Pl = 0 excludes the respective bid from the settlement range. 
By assumption, we regard only accepted bids, and thus omitted the Place attribute. 
The parameters for the other attributes were set as follows. 
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The number of bidders has naturally a positive impact on the efficiency of the re-
sults. The higher the number is, the higher is the competition. For our simulation, this 
fact has been incorporated by the uniformly randomized choice of the attribute values. 
The more bidders are simulated, the higher is the probability that the optimal bid is 
drawn. We took n = 8 delivery agents, respectively bidders, for our simulation setting, 
which reflects a realistic number of available dumpers at a medium sized road pave-
ment site. 
To capture the efficacy of our coordination artifact we compare the outcomes of 
the simulation with the expected values of the applied stochastic distribution. Since 
we used a discrete uniform distribution, the relative expected value of the deviation 
from the optimal attribute value is given by 
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The last term of the expression normalizes the absolute deviation of the respective-
ly aspired attribute value onto the interval [0, 1]. The resulting means are (rounded 
where necessary) 
 .%74.42%,50%,21.42%,50 Pr 

TiCoQu   
Basically, these benchmarks reflect a purely stochastically random allocation of the 
transport orders. The reason for the usage however is this: When weighting one par-
ticular attribute highly, we seek to figure out whether the outcome for the other attrib-
utes becomes worse than with a random allocation. Negation of this statement pro-
vides evidence for the effectivity of our artifact. As a motivational explanation, con-
sider also the case where the transport orders are allocated beforehand in the long 
term, with respect to a fixed plan. Eventually, the occurrence of stochastic environ-
mental disturbances is equivalent to a random allocation of the transport orders. Our 
artifact enables for short-term allocations and overcomes defects of that kind. 
4.2 Simulation Results 
Fig. 3 shows the resulting relative deviation for a ceteris paribus evaluation, where 
only the weighting factor of the Time attribute is varied. The other attribute values are 
set to 1 constantly. The results for the linear scoring rule are depicted as solid line. 
The dashed line depicts the results for the quadratic scoring rule. Regarding Q1 and 
Q2 the results match our expectation: Raising the weight for one attribute decreases 
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the average deviation at the cost of the average deviation for the other attributes. We 
can now quantify to what amount the variation of the weighting factor comes into 
effect. We describe in the following the results for the linear scoring rule. 
The Time deviation converges to 10%, which is an improvement of 15% compared 
to the deviation with Ti = 1. The deviation for the Quantity and the Prize converges 
to approx. 47%, which is a decline of about 20% compared to the smallest deviation, 
but still is slightly better than with a purely stochastic winner determination. The 
Condition converges to 40% declining by 15%, which is slightly better than the ran-
dom allocation, too. The results, however, suggest to choose a weighting factor of 8 
for the Time attribute, when the other attributes are weighted with 1, because the re-
sults for the Time deviation do not improve substantially for weights greater than 8.  
Regarding Q3, the results show that the effect of varying the weighting factor is 
more relaxed for the quadratic scoring rule as compared to the linear scoring rule. On 
the one hand, the improvement for the Time deviation is slightly worse than with the 
linear scoring rule. On the other hand, the decline for the other attributes is strictly 
better than with the linear scoring rule. The loss of improvement for the Time attribute 
is less than the savings from the decline for the other attributes. However, the total 
savings add up to about only 2% – 3%. 
Because in our scenario case not only the requirement of a just-in-time delivery is 
crucial, but also the condition, i.e. the temperature, we inquired what happens if both 
the weighting factors for the Time attribute and the Condition attribute are varied 
simultaneously, i.e. both attributes are weighted with the same factor. Fig. 4 shows 
Fig. 3. Relative deviations from the aspired attribute values in dependence of the weighting 
factor for the Time (the other weighting factors are 1) 
  
Fig. 4. Relative deviations from the aspired attribute values with simultaneous variation of the 
weighting factors for the Time and the Condition (the other weighting factors are 1) 
the corresponding results. Now, the Time deviation converges only to approx. 17%. 
And the Condition deviation has now nearly exactly the same results as the Time de-
viation. For the benefits of the Time and the Condition attribute the other attributes 
converge now to 50%, and hence converge to the expected value with random winner 
determination. Nonetheless, they do not exceed the purely stochastically expected 
deviations.  So, the decline for the Quantity, Prize, and Time deviation is only 3%, but 
the improvement for the Condition attribute is considerable high. That means, the 
consideration of a side constraint for just-in-time deliveries is effectively facilitated 
by our artifact. However, the results indicate that the relaxing effect of the quadratic 
scoring rule diminishes when weighting several attributes simultaneously.  
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
This research proposes a linear and a quadratic multi-attribute scoring rule for the 
coordination of just-in-time deliveries with an auction. The attributes for the auction 
reflect the general requirements for just-in-time deliveries. We have simulated our 
artifact to evaluate its usefulness and efficacy. We could indicate that the artifact fa-
cilitates an advantageous allocation of delivery orders. This holds in particular with 
respect to a side constraint (here: the Condition of the delivered asphalt, given by its 
temperature). With sole respect to the weighting factor of the Time attribute, we 
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showed that the quadratic scoring rule has a relaxing effect in terms of the expected 
deviations from the aspired attribute values. 
The coordination method accompanies a flexibilization of the order retrievals. This 
is in particularly beneficial to avoid tailbacks. A tailback arises, among others, due to 
the lack of storage place. In our pavement example, a tailback would lead to a binding 
of the important transport vehicles, so that shortages are the consequence.  
The generally tightened competition accentuates JiT requirements for logistics 
providers of several industries. Mail order companies, for instance, increase their 
competitiveness when they deliver the orders at a point in time which is preferred by 
the receivers. To that end, the mail order companies can potentially choose among 
various deliverers. The challenge is to select the best-suited deliverer. 
We see three research tasks to address limitations of our work: (1) We used a sim-
ple additive operation for the multi-attribute scoring and polynomial functions. There 
might be other operations or functions with different properties to inquire. (2) We 
evaluated a single-item auction although our model allows for combinatorial auctions, 
too. The question for just-in-time deliveries is, how to design a combinatorial auction 
to obtain optimal delivery sequences. (3) So far, we assumed truth telling for the bid-
ders. In fact, that reliance cannot be presupposed. Further investigation must be fo-
cused on the inducement of incentive compatibility. In case of strategic bidders, the 
mechanism is exposed to the danger of failure. 
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